






THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN ELECTION LAW 
The role of judges in election law is both important and contro-
versial.  Discussion about the appropriate role of judicial activism aris-
es in many areas, but election law raises particular concerns going to 
the heart of the democratic process.  In Judicial Activism and Passivism 
in Election Law, Professor Dan Tokaji argues that the judicial default 
should be passivism, but when minority rights are at stake or those in 
power seek to entrench themselves, judicial activism is warranted and 
necessary.  Professor Tokaji evaluates three recent cases in which the 
Supreme Court tackled election law and campaign finance—Bush v. 
Gore, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, and Citizens United v. 
FEC.  He argues that in Bush v. Gore, the Court appropriately inter-
vened where both minority rights and the potential for entrenchment 
were involved.   The later two cases, however, failed to strike the ap-
propriate balance:   the Court in Crawford neglected to act where it 
was necessary to prevent entrenchment, and in Citizens United, inter-
vened in a way that undermined legislation intended to bring about 
equality.  The Roberts Court, concludes Tokaji, lacks a coherent con-
stitutional theory of judicial activism, at least in matters of election 
law.  Allison Hayward, in Judging Politics in a Federalist System, responds 
that Tokaji’s definition of “election law” need not have a coherent 
constitutional theory because it is not a discrete area of law.  Hayward 
suggests that deference is warranted when a branch of government 
acts within its constitutionally prescribed limits; when it does not, the 
courts need not defer.  Hayward distinguishes Bush v. Gore and Craw-
ford on a basis of consistent application of the standard at issue, going 
on to argue that equal protection does not have a place in either case; 
thus the Court appropriately deferred to the legislative branch.  Citi-
zens United, however she concludes, is a free speech case rather than 
an election law case, and deserves strict scrutiny.  
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Judicial Activism and Passivism in Election Law 
Daniel P. Tokaji†
One of the few things that unites politicians across the political 
spectrum is a penchant for complaining about judicial activism.  The 
trouble is that they don’t agree on what it is or when it is appropriate.  
For decades, conservatives have complained of activism when it comes 
to constitutional decisions regarding desegregation, criminal proce-
dure, abortion, and gay rights.  In recent years, liberals have become 
increasingly concerned about judicial activism by the Rehnquist and 
Roberts Courts in striking down key parts of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, Violence Against Women Act, Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, and other federal laws.  
Some fear that health care reform or section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act will be the next to fall. 
 
To issue a blanket condemnation of judicial activism is, of course, 
too simplistic.  The challenge lies in articulating a principled basis for 
assessing what counts as “good” and “bad” activism.  It is fine and 
proper to insist on fidelity to the text of the Constitution.  But open-
ended terms like “equal protection,” “due process,” and “the freedom 
of speech” will not interpret themselves.  Their application instead 
demands a coherent theory that identifies the proper role of an inde-
pendent and largely unaccountable judiciary in our democracy.  Oth-
erwise, constitutional law will appear to many citizens as—and may in 
fact be—nothing more than politics by another name. 
Nowhere is this challenge more prominent and pressing than in 
the field of election law, as exemplified by three prominent cases:  
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), and Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010).  To many observers, including some legal scholars, these cases 
have the flavor of U.S. Supreme Court Justices indulging their own 
political preferences in the form of intractable constitutional law.  
This Opening Statement considers what sort of analysis courts should 
apply when it comes to election administration and campaign finance, 
two topics that have received a great deal of public and scholarly atten-
tion in recent years.  Using these cases as illustrative, I attempt to define 
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when judicial activism is warranted—and when “passivism” is more ap-
propriate—when dealing with the regulation of democratic politics. 
I.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
It is a point of common agreement that if judges are to undo the 
handiwork of elected officials, then they ought to have very good rea-
sons for doing so.  That is, courts should generally defer to the prefe-
rences of the citizenry as expressed through their elected representa-
tives at the federal, state, and local levels. 
This general principle applies to election law as well as to other 
fields.  There are, after all, multiple values at play in the regulation of 
the political process, including liberty, equality, integrity, transparen-
cy, and competitiveness.  When those values collide, as they sometimes 
do, people of goodwill may disagree over which to prioritize.  In addi-
tion, disagreements sometimes occur over the real-world impact of a 
particular practice.  Take, for example, the debate over voter identifi-
cation, where Democrats and Republicans tend to divide not only on 
whether to emphasize the value of access or integrity, but also on the 
effects of such policies.  It is generally the job of elected officials—not 
unelected judges—to resolve factual disagreements and to reconcile 
competing values.  Thus, passivism, not activism, should be the norm in 
judicial decisionmaking. 
On the other hand, courts sometimes are justified in according 
less deference to rules structuring the political process.  There are two 
main justifications for distrusting political actors and, accordingly, for 
close judicial scrutiny of some election laws and practices. 
The first is the risk that a majority will seek to weaken a minority 
of citizens by excluding them from full participation.  The most ob-
vious example is the systematic exclusion of African Americans from 
Southern politics through most of the twentieth century.  The Court’s 
decision in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), is 
an example of judicial activism in this area that almost everyone now 
considers justified.  In Harper, the Court struck down a $1.50 poll tax 
as a violation of equal protection.  Harper did not expressly rely on the 
racially discriminatory character of the poll tax, but instead relied on 
the likelihood that the tax would inhibit participation of economically 
disadvantaged voters.  Id. at 668.  This type of rationale for interven-
tion may be thought of as minority protection, in the sense that such 
intervention protects a minority of citizens from an exclusionary prac-
tice that the majority favors. 
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The other main reason for judicial intervention in elections is the 
risk that elected officials will promote their own self-interest at the ex-
pense of the polity.  As Justice Scalia has put it, “The first instinct of 
power is the retention of power.”  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Incum-
bent officeholders may adopt self-entrenching measures that make it 
difficult for voters to remove them from office.  Alternatively, they 
may seek to hold on to power through inaction—that is, through 
measures that leave in place electoral rules that prevent challengers 
from competing and that frustrate the will of the minority.  This ra-
tionale might thus be thought of as a form of majority protection, in 
the sense that it prevents elected officials from serving their own in-
terests at the expense of the citizenry. 
A prominent example of entrenchment through inaction is the 
egregious malapportionment of state legislative bodies that had de-
veloped by the mid-twentieth century.  Before the articulation of the 
“one person, one vote” rule in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 
(1964), state legislatures were under no constitutional mandate to re-
draw legislative districts after each decennial census.  In many states, 
redistricting had not occurred for decades.  As a result, the most pop-
ulous legislative district often had a population that was many times 
the size of the least populous.  See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545.  The con-
sequence was severe underrepresentation of voters in more heavily 
populated urban districts and effective minority rule by voters in less 
populated rural districts.  In Alabama, for example, 25.1% of the 
state’s population resided in districts that controlled a majority of 
state senate seats.  Id.  Of course, incumbent legislators who benefited 
from this system of unequal representation had no incentive to 
change it.  Judicial intervention was necessary, and ultimately came 
through Reynolds’s articulation of the “one person, one vote” principle 
requiring that legislative districts be equally populated. 
This does not, of course, mean that every law that arguably bur-
dens minority participation or promotes incumbent self-interest 
should be struck down.  The baseline presumption should still be that 
elected officials get to decide how best to promote the sometimes 
competing values in our democracy.  But the decisions of elected offi-
cials are less trustworthy—and the argument for searching judicial re-
view is accordingly stronger—when there is evidence that an electoral 
practice will impair participation by a political minority or serve the 
interests of those in power. 
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II.  BUSH V. GORE:  LOOKING BETTER WITH AGE 
In assessing judicial activism in the realm of election law, it is use-
ful to examine some of the Supreme Court’s most controversial deci-
sions of recent years with these justifications for judicial intervention 
in mind.  Viewed in this light, Bush v. Gore looks better now than it did 
to most commentators at the time it was decided. 
The majority in Bush concluded that the “arbitrary and disparate 
treatment” of voters in Florida’s 2000 recount denied those voters 
equal protection.  Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-11.  The Court cited just four 
equal protection cases:  Harper, Reynolds, and two other “one person, 
one vote” cases—Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), and Gray v. 
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).  The problem with Florida’s recount, ac-
cording to the majority, was the lack of clear rules for determining 
which ballots should count.  531 U.S. at 106.  Reading between the 
lines, the Court was concerned with the discretion that state law gave 
to local officials and state judges, which would allow those state offi-
cials and judges to manipulate the rules to benefit their preferred 
candidate.  See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection:  On 
Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2488-90 
(2003).  Put another way, the lack of a sufficiently clear standard 
threatened to result in the unfair exclusion of some voters and in 
skewed election results. 
In this sense, Bush v. Gore may be understood as marrying Harper’s 
concern with exclusion and Reynolds’s concern with entrenchment.  
To be more precise, the Court’s holding rests on a fear that state offi-
cials will abuse their discretion in a way that would unfairly prevent 
some voters from participating in the election.  There is no doubt that 
Bush v. Gore was an activist decision in that it reached beyond existing 
precedent to hold a state’s method of recounting votes unconstitu-
tional.  But it is a decision whose activism—at least with regard to its 
equal protection holding—may be justified by the need to prevent in-
equality and rein in official discretion. 
This assessment is not to deny that there are good reasons for cri-
ticizing Bush v. Gore.  The Court did a poor job explaining its reason-
ing and failed to specify the level of scrutiny it applied.  It explicitly 
left open the boundaries of the equal protection principle upon 
which it relied, although this is not all that unusual for a decision that 
breaks new constitutional ground.  Most problematic was the remedy 
the Court ordered, which called for an end to the recount, rather 
than an instruction that the Florida Supreme Court should decide 
whether to continue the recount under a clearer standard.  531 U.S. 
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at 110-11.  With these qualifications, the equal protection reasoning of 
Bush v. Gore looks better with a decade of hindsight than it did to 
many at the time. 
The Court deserves greater criticism for what has happened since 
2000.  It has avoided Bush v. Gore like the plague, refusing to cite it in 
any decision since then—including equal protection cases implicating 
equality of participation.  See Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite This Case!  
The Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141, 
144 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/75.pdf.  The 
Court has done nothing to clarify the equal protection principle that 
it relied upon in Bush v. Gore but instead, as explained below, has actual-
ly muddied the waters further.  It has treated Bush v. Gore as an embar-
rassment.  The real embarrassment, however, is the Court’s avoidance 
of the decision, which suggests that majority Justices have been unwil-
ling to abide by the principle that they relied upon in that case. 
III.  CRAWFORD:  FAILING TO PROTECT PARTICIPATION 
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board is the most important elec-
tion administration decision since 2000—and the one in which the 
Court most conspicuously failed to cite Bush v. Gore or wrestle with its 
implications.  In Crawford, the Court upheld Indiana’s law—enacted 
by a party-line vote, 553 U.S. at 203 n.21—which required most voters 
to present government-issued photo identification in order to have 
their votes counted.  Id. at 185-86.  Although no opinion commanded 
a majority, five Justices endorsed a sliding-scale test for evaluating bar-
riers to participation.  553 U.S. at 189-90 (Stevens, J., for himself, Ro-
berts, C.J. and Kennedy, J.); id. at 210 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting).  Under this standard, the strength of the government’s 
interest varies depending on the severity of the burden that the chal-
lenged electoral practice imposes.  For example, if voters were able to 
show that a registration requirement discriminates against a class of 
voters, or that it imposes a “severe” burden on their right to vote, then 
the state would have to show that this burden is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling interest.  Id. at 190.  On the other hand, if an elec-
toral practice is “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory,” then a more 
relaxed level of scrutiny applies.  Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
The obvious problem with this generic standard is that it provides 
little guidance in resolving hard cases, particularly ones where the 
evidence is scant or conflicting.  Crawford itself is a prime example.  
On the record before the Court, there was little evidence to show that 
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the law would seriously burden any individual voters or group of vot-
ers.  At the same time, Indiana produced no evidence showing any se-
rious problem with voter fraud that would require implementation of 
a voter identification law.  The state was unable to document even one 
instance of in-person voter impersonation—the only type of miscon-
duct that the law would prevent.  Id. at 194. 
Given the paucity of evidence, it should come as little surprise that 
the Justices who applied essentially the same standard came to differ-
ent conclusions.  The lead opinion by Justice Stevens found the state’s 
mostly hypothetical concerns sufficient to uphold the law, while the 
dissenting Justices found the burden to be unjustified by the state’s 
proffered interests.  Given the vagueness of the legal standards applied, 
it is easy to see how different Justices reached different conclusions. 
The main problem with Crawford is the majority Justices’ failure to 
reckon with the consequences of Harper.  Recall that the Harper Court 
struck down a poll tax that had a tendency to exclude economically 
disadvantaged voters, and in doing so, applied a standard that we 
would now refer to as strict scrutiny.  383 U.S. at 670 (holding that 
rules infringing on fundamental rights must be “closely scrutinized 
and carefully confined”).  The Court did so even without finding sta-
tistical evidence of a disparate impact on any particular group of vot-
ers, much less intentional discrimination toward any group.  The 
Court’s rationale was that the poll tax’s burden weighed especially 
heavily on economically disadvantaged voters and therefore denied 
“the opportunity for equal participation by all voters.”  Id. (quoting Rey-
nolds, 377 U.S. at 566). 
By the same token, there was evidence in Crawford that certain 
groups of voters were more likely to lack government-issued photo 
identification.  Those groups included poor, elderly, disabled, and 
homeless voters.  553 U.S. at 199 (plurality); id. at 212 n.4, 216  (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting).  That evidence should have been enough to place a 
heavier burden of justification on the state, especially given the party-
line vote by which Indiana’s law was enacted.  The absence of any evi-
dence of in-person voting fraud—the only illegality that the law pur-
ported to prevent—suggests that the real motivation was the Republi-
can majority’s desire to make it more difficult for Democratic-leaning 
voters to participate.  The constitutional argument against Indiana’s law 
thus recalls the entrenchment concerns that led the Court to intervene 
in Reynolds and in other “one person, one vote” cases.  In these cases, 
the concern is that a legislative majority is acting to entrench itself. 
Crawford was therefore a case in which the Court was unduly pas-
sivist.  Given the danger that it would deny equal participation and the 
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“danger signs” tending to show partisan motivation, the Court should 
have applied heightened scrutiny.  See Christopher S. Elmendorf, 
Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:  Explanations and Oppor-
tunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 359 (2007).  Had the Court applied such 
a test, there would have been no serious doubt as to the law’s unconstitu-
tionality, given the state’s failure to produce any evidence that it would 
stop illegal voting. 
IV.  CITIZENS UNITED:  DENYING EQUALITY 
While the Court has been too passive when dealing with barriers 
to voter participation, it has been overly aggressive when dealing with 
the regulation of campaign finance.  The most controversial example 
in recent years is the decision in Citizens United, in which the Court 
struck down a key component of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA).  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917.  Citizens United’s conclusion 
that corporate expenditures on elections are a form of speech that the 
First Amendment protects has generated the most criticism.  But the 
real problem with Citizens United is its rejection of political equality as 
a countervailing democratic value that may sometimes justify limits on 
campaign spending. 
Citizens United struck down the BCRA’s prohibition on corpora-
tions funding “electioneering” expenditures from their treasuries.  Id. 
at 886.  The majority opinion subjected the law to strict scrutiny under 
the First Amendment after finding that the law imposed a burden on 
corporate speech.  Id. at 898.  This part of the Court’s holding broke 
no new ground.  There are, moreover, good reasons for applying a 
heightened level of scrutiny to laws that impede election-related ex-
pression.  When incumbent legislators act to impose limits on political 
spending, they may be acting to promote their own interests in reelec-
tion—for example, by making it more difficult for challengers to 
compete.  Of course, legislators may also promote their own interest 
by failing to enact limits on campaign spending, since the status quo 
may well inure to the advantage of incumbents.  Still, it is at least 
possible that limits on campaign spending may impede competition, 
and therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to apply some form of 
heightened scrutiny. 
The real significance of Citizens United is its rejection of political 
equality as a justification for imposing limits on campaign spending.  
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Court allowed restric-
tions on corporate expenditures based on the state interest in curbing 
“the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
2011] The Role of Judges in Election Law 281 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form.”  
494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990).  This reasoning was an equality rationale; 
it was designed to promote the ideal of equality in the realm of demo-
cratic politics.  Citizens United, however, overruled Austin, taking equal-
ity as a justification for limits on corporate expenditures off the table.  
Citizens United also rejected the argument that the interest in preventing 
corruption of the electoral process could justify a ban on corporate 
electioneering.  Whether corporations have unequal access to the polit-
ical process and unequal influence on its outputs was beside the point, 
from the Court’s perspective, because only the reality or appearance of 
quid pro quo corruption can justify spending limits.  Id. at 910-11. 
Citizens United’s holding is consistent with the main thrust of Su-
preme Court precedent over the past four decades, which has mostly 
rejected equality as a justification for campaign finance regulation.  
The most notable example before Citizens United was Buckley v. Valeo, 
which held that the “concept that government may restrict the speech 
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice 
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”  424 U.S. 1, 48-49 
(1976).  The problem with this line of precedent is that it usurps the 
role of legislative bodies in determining how best to balance the vari-
ous competing values at play in our democracy.  There is no doubt 
that money is essential to effective speech in the context of political 
campaigns.  The corollary of this proposition is that those without sig-
nificant financial resources lack the capacity for effective speech.  In a 
system of unlimited spending, there is a pronounced risk that the 
speech of the “have-a-lots” will overwhelm the speech of the “have-
nots.”  This is anathema to a society that is committed to the principle 
of “one person, one vote.”  See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Oblitera-
tion of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law (and Why the Canadian 
Approach Is Superior), (The Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 140, 2011), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1746868 
(providing a more detailed explanation of Citizens United’s overruling 
of the Austin antidistortion rationale). 
To be sure, citizens may have legitimate disagreements as to 
whether the value of political equality should outweigh other values, 
such as liberty.  The problem with Citizens United is that it entirely re-
moves equality from the conversation.  After Citizens United, legislative 
bodies may not even consider political equality as a justification for 
limits on political spending.  If they do, any limits they impose are 
sure to be struck down.  For this reason, Citizens United represents unjus-
tified activism.  In prohibiting legislative bodies from even considering 
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equality as a justification for campaign finance regulation, the Court ar-
rogates to itself the power to determine the democratic values that our 
electoral system may serve.  The interest in preventing voter exclusion 
or in preventing incumbent entrenchment cannot justify its activism. 
CONCLUSION 
Some of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions in recent 
years have involved constitutional challenges to election laws.  The 
strong political valence of these cases tends to induce accusations that 
the Court is engaging in judicial activism.  The real challenge, how-
ever, is to articulate a coherent basis for when activism is and is not 
appropriate in the regulation of the political process. 
This Opening Statement has identified two justifications for un-
elected judges’ supplanting elected officials’ judgment in electoral 
process decisions:  the protection of minorities and the prevention of 
self-interested behavior by those in power.  Judged by these criteria, 
Bush v. Gore’s equal protection holding may be understood as justifia-
ble activism.  The Court’s more recent decisions in Crawford and Citi-
zens United do not stand up as well—though for very different reasons.  
Crawford was too passivist, failing to closely scrutinize an election rule 
that burdened certain voters while benefiting the majority party.  By 
contrast, the Court in Citizens United exhibited an inappropriate de-
gree of activism, taking equality off the table as a justification for limits 
on campaign spending. 
Those who disagree with this assessment have the burden of arti-
culating a coherent theory of constitutional interpretation under 
which the Court’s activism in Citizens United—as well as its passivism in 
Crawford—may be justified.  So far, the Roberts Court has failed mi-
serably at this task. 
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REBUTTAL 
Judging Politics in a Federalist System 
Allison R. Hayward†
I want to respond to Professor Tokaji’s Opening Statement first by 
saying something about election law as a discrete legal area.  Deeming 
“election law” a field of study is somewhat like deeming the former 
Yugoslavia a country.  You can draw a line around almost anything, 
but if the interior lacks unifying features or principles, the exercise 
may not yield anything useful.  Indeed, if you group unlike things to-
gether and expect them to cohere when they should not, spurious 
discord results.  This is the problem that occurs when Professor Toka-
ji—and many others—demand a “coherent” constitutional theory to 
explain election law holdings.  In this Rebuttal, I will discuss the same 
three cases Professor Tokaji discussed—Crawford v. Marion County Elec-
tion Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)—because they exemplify 
the problem I am trying to describe. 
 
Constitutional adjudication, the context in which judges (and par-
ticularly Supreme Court Justices) are often tarred as “activists,” in-
volves two major considerations.  Professor Tokaji focuses on the pro-
tection of individual rights, as set forth in the amendments to the 
Constitution.  But the Constitution also sets forth a structure.  It de-
scribes three branches of the federal government and a division of la-
bor between federal and state governments, which is defined by the 
Constitutional limits on federal power.  When state and federal gov-
ernments operate within the Constitution’s limits, the choices of those 
governments deserve the courts’ deference.  If they do not operate 
therein, then no deference is warranted. 
The Constitution specifies a few places where only the states, and 
not the federal government, should operate.  One of those areas is 
specified in Article I, Section 4, which declares, “The Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, 
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such Regulations, ex-
cept as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, 
cl. 1.  A case like Crawford implicates this state power. 
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I agree with Professor Tokaji’s description of the posture of Craw-
ford.  In retrospect, the litigants might have done better to allow a 
record of effects to mature and to instead bring an as-applied chal-
lenge, claiming that the law created an unconstitutional burden on 
voting.  As it was, the Court heard a case where there was little evi-
dence of injury or efficacy—which contrasts with the position the 
Court was in when it considered the poll tax in Harper v. Virginia Board 
of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  Given Crawford’s posture, the Court 
reasonably concluded that the state’s voter identification law deserved 
deference against this facial challenge.  When litigants challenge elec-
tion-administration laws, they run up against the constitutional text 
that grants authority over election administration to the states.  In 
such cases, the Court has dealt with the competing rights of states and 
voters by constructing a balancing test, which is suboptimal if one pri-
oritzes clarity and predictability.  See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 
428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see also Bryan P. 
Jensen, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: The Missed Oppor-
tunity to Remedy the Ambiguity and Unpredictability of Burdick, 86 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 535 (2009). 
The Court considered the frontiers of state discretion in Bush v. 
Gore.  Generally, Florida’s administrators, lawmakers, and courts should 
deal with the counting of citizens’ ballots under Article I, Section 4.  Yet 
while states may have the power to regulate elections, they cannot im-
pose arbitrary and inconsistent election-administration procedures.  
They cannot be lawless.  The Court’s remedy in Bush v. Gore still sticks 
in the craw of many people, and I understand why this is so.  However, 
the Court’s majority preferred finality, which I can also understand. 
Opponents of the Indiana voter identification law in Crawford 
might argue that the state’s voter identification law is ineffective at 
reaching the more likely instances of voter fraud.  As an initial matter, 
I think there is a distinction to be drawn between a state voting regula-
tion that is marginally effective but applied consistently over the state 
and standardless ballot-counting that leads to inconsistencies within 
the state.  But even if there isn’t a distinction, election-administration 
doctrine and standards of review allow for state discretion in situations 
where Congress, in its infinite wisdom, has left the issue to the states’ 
authority.  Were Congress to step in and impose a national voter iden-
tification requirement (or a national standard for assessing dimpled 
chads, or a national felon-voting standard), then that law would also 
be assessed under the more deferential standards applied to election-
administration rules and regulations.  Of course, there is a place for 
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an equal protection claim—when the antecedent discriminatory in-
tent and impact are apparent.  But that is not the case in Bush v. Gore 
or Crawford. 
Not that constitutional litigators need my advice, but I think that a 
strategy of pursuing voter identification cases with Harper as the lead-
ing case will not work.  It seems that courts would find a voter identifi-
cation law unconstitutional in one of two situations.  First, the law 
would fail in a situation where the litigants can show both a disparate 
impact on a protected minority group and the intent to discriminate 
against that group.  This is the classic equal protection formulation a 
lawyer would argue in challenging any kind of governmental act.  
Second, the litigants could, in the right situation, classify the voter 
identification law as arbitrary, ineffective, and counterproductive, 
such that the state’s use of it cannot be justified as applied to specific 
cohorts of voters—even when the burden on voters is modest.  Today, 
the Court and federal circuits are not going to find a “wealth discrim-
ination” Harper-esque argument convincing.  We may not all be Key-
nesians anymore, but we all are, for now at least, capitalists.  See Ike 
Brannon, We Were All Keynesians Then, CATO INST. (Jan. 9, 2006), 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5362. 
All of this says nothing about how campaign regulations should be 
evaluated.  Campaign finance restrictions are not election-
administration laws.  They are content-based restrictions on speech 
and association.  Campaigns and elections are both political, but they 
are not the same thing.  There is no constitutionally directed state au-
thority at issue.  It does not make sense to lump them into some “elec-
tion law” classification that includes election-administration cases, ethics 
and lobbying rules, and redistricting, among other things.  Accordingly, 
“judicial activism” should not be evaluated in the same way. 
The holding of Citizens United, that the federal ban on indepen-
dent expenditures and electioneering communications is unconstitu-
tional, must be correct.  130 S. Ct. at 886.  There is no characteristic 
uniting all corporations that justifies a uniform, outright federal ban.  
Could wealth be one such characteristic?  Not all corporations have 
wealth—and many other entities in society are wealthy yet are not sub-
ject to the expenditure ban.  And no, it doesn’t matter that corpora-
tions aren’t “real people.”  The freedom of speech and assembly un-
der the Constitution protects the rights of speakers to speak and of 
listeners to hear a message.  There may be messages that aren’t pro-
tected—obscenity and libel, for example—but any source of a message 
gets to speak.  Imagine the situation if this weren’t true:  a Republican 
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Congress could selectively silence public employee unions, or govern-
mental incumbents could impose content-based restrictions indirectly. 
If the Supreme Court had been a more straightforward activist in 
its approach to First Amendment cases in 1957, we wouldn’t be having 
the argument over the holding in Citizens United today.  See United 
States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); Allison R. Hayward, Revisiting 
the Fable of Reform, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421 (2008).  In UAW-CIO, the 
Court was presented with a labor union’s constitutional challenge to 
the campaign expenditure ban.  Id. at 568 (describing the ban under 
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952)).  The leading legal thinkers of the time 
thought the ban was unconstitutional.  See Hayward, supra, at 460-61.  
The Court was unduly passive, and after holding that the union’s ex-
penditures constituted a violation of the expenditure ban, it then re-
manded the case.  UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 589-93.  The Court thus 
avoided the constitutional question.  The ban’s constitutionality had 
to be assessed eventually, and it is stunning (and unfortunate) that it 
took until 2010 to resolve this question. 
In short, Professor Tokaji has drawn a line around three cases and 
found them inconsistent.  I would draw a line around only two, Bush v. 
Gore and Crawford, and conclude that they are consistent.  Citizens Unit-
ed is simply a different creature—it’s a speech case, not an elections case.  
Speech cases involving content-based restrictions deserve strict scrutiny; 
elections cases are judged by something more deferential.  To me, it isn’t 
any more complicated than that. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Electoral Equality:  Why Campaign Finance Isn’t So Special 
Daniel P. Tokaji 
In her inimitably engaging and enlightening style, Allison Hay-
ward tries to draw a bright line between the two domains of election 
law discussed in my Opening Statement:  election administration and 
campaign finance.  She defends the Court’s holding in Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), on the ground that “it’s a speech case, 
not an elections case.”  Because restrictions on speech are usually sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, she argues, the Court was correct in striking 
down the prohibition on corporate electioneering in Citizens United.  
By contrast, burdens on voting, including ones that bear dispropor-
tionately on economically disadvantaged citizens, are generally subject 
to a more deferential review.  
Hayward provides a fair description of current doctrine.  But my 
main point is that this doctrine is defective—more precisely, this doc-
trine is not justified by a coherent conception of the proper role of 
courts in a democracy.  By way of reply, I will explain my underlying con-
cern with the Court’s approach to the regulation of elections, focusing 
mostly on campaign finance, the topic on which we most sharply diverge. 
Let me return to the premise of my argument.  Principled judicial 
activism demands a reconciliation of the Court’s stringent approach 
to burdens on campaign spending with its generally tolerant approach 
to burdens on voting.  Hayward’s key move—the first of two I contest 
here—is to isolate campaign finance because it involves speech, not 
elections.  It is certainly true that campaign finance involves 
speech . . . but it also involves elections.  Proponents of campaign 
finance regulation are concerned about the effect that vast inequali-
ties in financial resources will have on election results and on the de-
cisions elected officials make once in office. 
More importantly, the characterization of campaign spending as 
speech—or at least “speechy,” as Professor Richard Briffault has put 
it—does not end the constitutional conversation, but only begins it.  
See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 
119 n.3 (2010) (explaining the origin of Briffault’s phrase).  The term 
“freedom of speech,” like “equal protection of the laws,” is not self-
defining.  It demands interpretation, both with regard to the level of 
protection that different forms of expression receive and the counter-
vailing justifications that may warrant regulation.  Although the United 
States provides broader protection for speech than other democracies, 
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the Supreme Court has never embraced the free speech absolutism 
most famously espoused by Justices Black and Douglas.  Some catego-
ries of speech—such as obscenity and fighting words—receive no pro-
tection at all.  Others—such as commercial speech and campaign con-
tributions—are reviewed under less than strict scrutiny.  These different 
levels of scrutiny reflect judgments about both the value of the speech 
in question and countervailing values that warrant regulation. 
As First Amendment doctrine developed in the twentieth century, 
the Court recognized a number of countervailing values that may 
sometimes justify limits on speech, even protected speech.  These val-
ues include some indisputably important ones, such as the prevention 
of imminent violence, threats to national security, and corruption; the 
Court has also recognized countervailing interests that are less weighty, 
such as the protection of public morals and even aesthetics.1
The main problem with the Supreme Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence is the Court’s rejection of political equality as a counter-
vailing value.  Hayward claims that the Court’s holding in Citizens Unit-
ed, striking down the federal prohibition on corporate electioneering, 
“must be correct.”  But this is only true if one agrees that the Court 
was right in taking equality off the table as a value that may sometimes 
justify restrictions on campaign spending. 
  My point 
here is not to argue for or against any of these decisions or the interests 
they recognize.  Rather, the point is that our First Amendment tradition 
recognizes that speech must sometimes give way to other values. 
The Court’s holding in Citizens United does not just create a con-
flict between free speech and equal protection.  It also creates a con-
flict within the First Amendment.  For if one accepts the proposition 
that money facilitates election-related speech, then it follows that 
those without resources effectively lack speech—or, more precisely, 
lack the ability to be heard in the electoral marketplace.  As Kathleen 
Sullivan has recently observed, there is both a libertarian strain and an 
egalitarian strain to our First Amendment tradition.  See Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145 
(2010).  In the context of campaign finance regulation, these two 
strains are in direct conflict. 
 
1
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (national securi-
ty); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (aes-
thetics); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (corruption); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Sla-
ton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (public morals); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
(imminent violence).  
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What justifies the Court’s rejection of equality as a justification for 
campaign finance regulation?  The best answer that deregulationists 
can offer is that limits on campaign spending may lead to the entren-
chment of incumbents.  This is partially true.  As Justice Scalia has put 
it, the “first instinct of power is the retention of power.”  McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).  Some regulatory schemes may well have the effect of 
helping incumbents and hurting challengers.  But not all regulations 
will have that effect.  To the contrary, a completely unregulated politi-
cal marketplace may be to the greatest advantage of incumbent of-
ficeholders—after all, the smart money will most likely be with them. 
Whether a particular scheme of regulation actually promotes 
equality and whether it impedes competition are difficult empirical 
questions.  The problem with the Court’s jurisprudence is that it fore-
closes empirical answers by eliminating equality as a value that can ev-
er justify limits on campaign spending.  This is the central flaw in the 
Court’s campaign finance activism, from which the erroneous deci-
sion in Citizens United follows. 
This point brings me back to the subject of election administra-
tion.  Despite the Court’s longstanding recognition that the right to 
vote is fundamental, and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Roberts Court has been quite passive when it comes to laws 
and practices that burden voting.  Aside from Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000), the Court has been insufficiently sensitive to the risk that in-
cumbent officeholders may manipulate political rules to their own ad-
vantage.  The leading example so far is the Court’s decision to uphold 
Indiana’s strict voter identification law in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), despite the law’s tendency to im-
pose a burden on voting by citizens of limited means. 
Hayward plays the federalism card here, asserting that Article I, 
Section 4 gives the states power to make election rules.  That is cer-
tainly true; but again, this delegation of power only begins the inquiry, 
since states’ election systems must comply with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court has long held that voting is a fun-
damental right and, therefore, that infringements on this right—like 
restrictions on most speech—warrant strict scrutiny.  The difficult 
question is identifying which burdens on voting trigger heightened 
scrutiny, and what countervailing interest may justify those burdens.  
In this area, the Court has virtually ignored Justice Scalia’s warning 
about the first instinct of power. 
To be clear, my point is not that the same constitutional rule should 
apply in all election law contexts.  The problems that arise in these two 
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areas are not identical.  But they are not apples and oranges, either.  
Both election administration and campaign finance raise the question 
of the proper role of the courts in the regulation of the political 
process.  It is not sufficient to answer that one involves speech and the 
other elections.  A better answer would look to whether political actors 
can be trusted to balance the competing democratic values at stake and 
to whether they have done so reliably, in particular circumstances.  Un-
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Is Egalitarianism Valuable? 
Allison R. Hayward 
I am sorry that this will be the last word in our Debate.  Although I 
would have liked to pin down Professor Tokaji a bit more successfully 
on several of his key points, I will at least explain why I disagree with a 
few of his arguments.  In doing so, I will try to limit my discussion to 
those parameters. 
Professor Tokaji and I agree on the basics of current Supreme 
Court doctrine regarding the role of judges in election law but disag-
ree on whether that doctrine is coherent.  I am wrong, he says, to sep-
arate campaign finance and election administration.  Professor Tokaji 
contends that courts should treat both domains similarly since both 
“involve[] elections.”  That is, proponents of campaign finance regu-
lation are concerned in part about the effects of financial resources 
on election results.  But it cannot be the case that to determine the 
scope of election administration, one should look at whether a poten-
tial target of regulation can affect election results.  There is no logical 
limit to such a classification.  Anything and everything could potential-
ly “affect” election results. 
More fundamentally, I think Professor Tokaji and I simply disag-
ree on what role the state should have in politics.  He believes the 
state has a proper and salutary role in both campaign finance and 
election administration, whereas I see campaigns as requiring protec-
tion from state interference.  Therefore, I think it is coherent to treat 
campaign regulation differently from election regulation.  A cam-
paign involves a debate among the public, candidates, political par-
ties, the press, and others about who should govern.  The election is 
the moment in which a subset of that group—the voters—makes a 
choice.  While it may be desirable to have a traffic cop patrol the con-
duct of the vote, the same cannot be said about a censor who mucks 
up the debate leading to the vote. 
Professor Tokaji also argues that both campaign finance regula-
tion and election-administration regulation should further egalitarian 
values.  I disagree with this proposition because I fail to see how laws 
can regulate campaign finance in a manner that serves “equality.”  I 
do, however, understand how elections can be administered in ways 
that serve equality, and ultimately, democracy; regulators can set rea-
sonable qualifications for voters, make registration and balloting ac-
cessible, and count the votes fairly. 
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Professor Tokaji seems to believe that the sheer sums of money 
spent in campaigns endanger elections.  I am not sure if this notion is 
correct.  One reason for my skepticism is that, empirically, there are 
just too many campaigns where the candidate that spends the most 
money loses.  See, e.g., Anne Bauer, Candidate Self-Financing:  More Bar-
rier Than Stepping Stone, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS 
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView. 
phtml?r=438 (identifying the 2010 California gubernatorial campaign 
as an example).  I have observed on one occasion that Meg Whitman, 
who spent over $140 million of her own money and yet lost the 2010 
California gubernatorial race, flies commercial now. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the “vast inequalities in financial 
resources” that distort campaign spending endanger “democracy” or 
“equality,” a federal ban on corporate expenditures does not solve 
that problem.  Many actors in society have wealth, but only some of 
those actors are corporations.  Moreover, only a small minority of cor-
porations spend money on campaigns; in the world before Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), incorporated groups still had 
other, less direct ways of participating in politics.  For example, they 
could communicate internally with executives, fund tax-exempt 
groups, or run issue advertising.  Thus, the corporate-expenditure ban 
was both overbroad and underinclusive.  Again, the holding in Citizens 
United was clearly correct as an application of constitutional law, and I 
do not see anything in Professor Tokaji’s reply to the contrary. 
Why isn’t more campaign spending better?  I observe that “weal-
thy” interests are actually quite heterogeneous.  Thus, isn’t it a service 
to democracy that private organizations want to battle it out among 
themselves for voters’ favor?  Put another way, the restrictions on 
campaign spending seem to be inherently antidemocratic.  I doubt 
whether restrictions that silence speakers preserve any “value” in cam-
paigns.  Limits on speakers seem to make as much sense as imposing 
earplugs (or blindfolds) on voters. 
 
 
